This work revises and updates a study that Monsignor Patrick J. Dignan conducted in 1933. Dignan's purpose in his study was to outline the history of how the Roman Catholic Church secured laws for the protection of church property in accordance with the hierarchical nature of the Church. The purpose of this article is to bring Dignan's work up to date and to complete a survey of the law in its present state. This article analyzes the differences in the law since the original survey to determine whether Dignan's conclusion that the Church should operate to affect legislation in this field has had any effect.
I. INTRODUCTION In 1933 Monsignor Patrick J. Dignan submitted a dissertation to the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Catholic University entitled A History of the Legal Incorporation of Catholic Church Property in the United
. 1 Dignan's purpose in his study, besides the fulfillment of the requirement for his Doctor of Philosophy degree, was to outline the history of how the Roman Catholic Church ("the Church") secured laws for the protection of church property in accordance with the nature of the Church.
2 His history covers the process that incorporation of church property took in the existing states.
3 He posited that the existing legislation in many states was not suitable to the hierarchical nature or discipline of the Church. 4 He also noted that, at the time, "works dealing specifically with the tenure of" property in the Church were very uncommon. 5 Dignan concluded his study by stating that the inadequacy of the law, at the time of his study, required work on the part of the Church to provide adequate legislation in the states whose statutes were geared to provide for lay control of Church property, because he believed that those statutes were not suitable to the hierarchical structure of the Church. 6 Works dealing with the tenure of property in the Church are still uncommon. 7 There is no updated survey of how the Church incorporates to hold property in the United States today. The purpose of this article is to bring Dignan's work up to date and to complete a survey of the law in its present state. The article will also analyze differences in the law since the original survey to determine whether Dignan's conclusion 8 that the Church should operate to affect legislation in this field has had any effect. (1933 Dignan's historical work needs no updating so this article will not tackle that perspective. 10 The author will only address updating the law, include Hawaii and Alaska in the survey, which were omitted in the original work, and compare the law in 1933 with existing law.
11 In addition to updating Dignan's survey, this work will include a complete revision of Dignan 14 Corporation aggregate or aggregate corporation are other ways of referring to a corporation when distinguishing it from a corporation sole. 15 The management of Church property through legislation dictated that corporation aggregate regimes arose during the early period of United States history in which mistrust of the Church's hierarchical structure led state legislatures to require lay trustees to hold Church property in that form.
16
Canon law defines a diocese as "a portion of the people of God" entrusted to the care of a bishop and priests of the diocese.
17 A parish is a defined community of the faithful entrusted to the care of a parish priest.
18
Canon law designates both the parish and diocese as public juridic persons. 19 As the parish and diocese are both described as communities, they can be considered to fall into the category of public juridic persons, known as aggregates of persons. 20 The distinction of public juridic person as an aggregate of persons would indicate that, under canon law, the Church could avail itself of the corporation aggregate mechanism to manage property. 21 However, canon law also assigns a stewardship role to the bishop in the diocese 22 and to the pastor in the parish, 23 creating in them the power to act respectively for diocese and parish in financial and administrative issues.
24
It is important to reemphasize here that the distinctions outlined above are based on canon law and not in civil law.
25
As Dignan indicated, the Church needed a civil law mechanism to reflect its canon law nature. 26 Historically, under English common law, the Church had the ability to hold property in its own right as a separate civil law entity through the mechanism of corporation sole.
27 Corporation sole is a civil law distinction based on canon law that recognizes the composition of a corporation with a single person, usually the incumbent of an ecclesiastical office, as distinct from a corporation aggregate.
28 English common law did not limit corporation sole to ecclesiastical matters, but also recognized it in the person of the monarch, in charitable corporations (hospitals and colleges), and in "temporal" corporations (municipalities, counties, townships).
29
Despite Dignan's assertion that most states' legislation was unsuitable to the Church's hierarchical nature, 30 there are a number of jurisdictions in which corporation sole regimes have been available. 31 Generally, the statutes creating corporations sole state that the office holder must be duly elected or chosen, and must act in accordance with the rules of the organization represented. 32 For bishops in the Church, acting as a corporation sole on behalf of the dioceses-acting in accordance with the rules of the organization-means that they must be chosen and perform the duties of their offices in accordance with canon law. incorporate to hold property. 34 There is also a fifth, or combined, possibility for incorporation. 35 The first four paradigms exist in states that may have specific statutes allowing for corporations sole or aggregate and those that may have general statutes allowing for corporations sole or aggregate.
36
The fifth possibility is found in states that allow for general church incorporation and for the option to form either type of corporation.
37
Appendix A contains a list divided according to these five possibilities, including citations to the pertinent legislation.
IV. PARADIGMS OF INCORPORATION STATUTES

A. First Paradigm-Specific Corporations Sole Statutes
In the legislation this article covers there were no general state statutes that allowed for the Church to form a corporation sole.
38 There were twelve cases: the dioceses of Baltimore, Maryland; Boston, Massachusetts; Charleston, South Carolina; Chicago, Illinois; Covington, Kentucky; Fall River, Massachusetts; Louisville, Kentucky; Manchester, New Hampshire; Portland, Maine; Providence, Rhode Island; Springfield, Massachusetts; and Worcester, Massachusetts, where a general state statute specifically indicates that the Church should form a corporation aggregate, but private or special laws allow for dioceses within the state to form as corporations sole. 39 The Maryland legislature enacted the earliest of these special laws, which created a corporation sole in the Archbishop of Baltimore in 1832.
40
In 1845, the Illinois legislature passed an act allowing the Bishop of Chicago to create a corporation sole. 41 The Illinois law was amended in 1861, but its essence remained unchanged.
42
By 1853 the legislature of Kentucky joined in creating a corporation sole in the Bishop of Covington. 43 The legislature of South Carolina followed suit in 1880 by creating a corporation sole in the Bishop of Charleston. 44 In 1887, the legislatures of Kentucky and Maine created corporations sole in the Bishops of Louisville and Portland, respectively. Massachusetts followed in 1897 and 1898 with the creation of a corporation sole for the Archbishop of Boston and the Bishop of Springfield. 46 In the early twentieth century, Rhode Island (1900), New Hampshire (1901), and again Massachusetts (1904 and 1950) followed with enactments for the Bishops of Providence, Manchester, Fall River, and Worcester, respectively.
47
B. Second Paradigm-General Corporations Sole Statutes
In this group of twelve states: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming, churches may incorporate as corporations sole. 48 The statutes in these states do not speak of the Church specifically, but since churches in general may incorporate in this manner, and given the hierarchal nature of the Church, it is very likely that the Church in these states has incorporated using the corporation sole model.
49
C. Third Paradigm-Specific Corporations Aggregate States
The next two paradigms address jurisdictions in which the Church has itself sought exceptions to the general rule in order to incorporate as a corporation sole. 50 The statutes of these states specifically address how the Church will incorporate to hold property. Vermont has specific laws addressing the incorporation of Protestant churches, but is silent on the topic of the Catholic Church. 58 The remaining four cases: Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, and New Hampshire, where dioceses were granted the ability to incorporate as corporations sole through special or private laws, are found in this paradigm. In this group there were also repeals of general laws and enactments of special or private laws that eliminated any distinction between religious corporations and non-profit corporations.
61 However, this group differs from the fourth paradigm because its states allow either form of incorporation.
62
Assuming Dignan's assertion is accurate, that corporations sole best suit the hierarchical nature of the Church, 63 it is likely that the Church would choose to form a corporation sole in these jurisdictions.
V. COMPARISON WITH THE SITUATION OF CHURCH INCORPORATION IN 1933
The final chapter of Dignan's work outlines the legal status of incorporation of Church property in 1933. 64 Dignan does not specifically identify a set of paradigms for his survey, but a closer analysis of his work allows for the identification of five distinct paradigms.
65 In Dignan's work, the first four paradigms align with the first four paradigms in this study. number of states proscribed the incorporation of religious organizations through constitutional provisions. 68 Just as is currently the case, Dignan did not identify any state in which the general statutes explicitly authorized corporations sole by the Church (first paradigm). 69 He did identify a small group of six dioceses where bishops or archbishops of the Church incorporated as corporations sole through special or private laws. 70 The group of dioceses that Dignan identified includes Baltimore, Boston, Charleston, Chicago, Manchester, and Providence. 71 In his survey, he failed to identify the dioceses of Covington, Kentucky; Fall River, Massachusetts; Louisville, Kentucky; Portland, Maine; and Springfield, Massachusetts, all five of which had been granted the corporation sole option before 1933.
72
The Diocese of Worcester, Massachusetts, became the twelfth first paradigm corporation sole diocese when the state legislature granted it the option to form a corporation sole in 1950.
73 From the evidence of these twelve cases, where special laws were enacted to enable the Church to create corporations sole in states that expressly indicated a different option in their general laws, it would appear that from the mid-nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century, the Church campaigned to obtain special laws allowing for the creation of corporations sole in those dioceses that fell outside second paradigm states. 74 The majority of these laws were secured before Dignan completed his survey in 1933, the only exception being the 1950 enactment in Massachusetts for the Bishop of Worcester. 75 These laws granting the option of corporation sole to the Church appeared in seven states, which were evenly spread throughout the second and third paradigms. 76 Five of these states belonged to the group of the original thirteen colonies (Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Rhode Island) while the other two (Kentucky and Illinois) became states in the early nineteenth century. 77 This organizational breakdown tends to support the hypothesis that, prior to the twentieth century, the Church deliberately labored to procure legislation favorable to its hierarchical nature in areas of the country where a traditional distrust and historical animosity toward the Church existed. 78 Dignan identified a small group of eight states belonging to the second paradigm, where general legislation existed allowing the mechanism of corporation sole for churches and religious organizations. 79 Since 1935, there has been minimal change in the composition of this group. The original group of eight: Alabama, Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming, has grown to twelve with the addition of Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Montana, and Oregon. 80 The present number stands at twelve and not thirteen because Georgia statutes now allow for the choice of either type of corporation for churches, placing Georgia in the fifth paradigm, which did not exist at the time of Dignan's survey. 81 With the exception of Alabama, and, at the time of Dignan's work, Georgia, the preponderance of the states where a corporation sole is allowed as a means of incorporation for churches fall, geographically, in the West. 82 Further, Alaska and Hawaii, the two states added since Dignan's survey, have fallen within this paradigm.
83
The third paradigm group, where specific statutes require the Church to incorporate as a corporation aggregate, has been the most stable of all paradigms. 84 The law and the composition of this group of eight states have not changed since 1935. 85 Significantly, three of the states (Maryland, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island) where the Church has secured special laws allowing for the creation of corporations sole in some of their dioceses, are in this group.
86
The fourth paradigm, where general statutes referring to churches and religious societies require incorporation as a corporation aggregate, was the largest concentration of states in 1935 and remains the largest today.
87
Twenty-nine out of forty-eight states in 1935, plus the District of Columbia, fell within the fourth paradigm. 88 Today this group has declined to include only nineteen states despite Dignan's assertion that the Church should have made efforts to change legislation in its favor. 89 This diminution in number appears to be linked to changes in law reflecting societal changes. Of the eleven states where a paradigm shift occurred, only three: Colorado, Montana, and Oregon, moved to a regime under the second paradigm, requiring the creation of corporations sole for churches in general. 90 The other eight states, plus the District of Columbia, shifted to a regime allowing for the creation of either type of corporation under a new paradigm, which did not exist in 1933.
91 A significant number of these jurisdictions shifting to the new paradigm drafted their new legislation without reference to churches or religious organizations.
92
These jurisdictions include Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Nevada, North Dakota, and the District of Columbia, which all fell within the fourth paradigm in 1935, but have now all changed their legislation to address incorporation of nonprofit organizations under either aggregate or sole regimes. 93 Further, the law in Georgia (formerly in the second paradigm) also signaled this same shift by repealing its previous law in favor of an enactment addressing incorporation of non-profit organizations under either aggregate or sole regimes.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS
In the fifty-year period after the American Revolution, the new states embarked on a period of disestablishment by barring churches from any official position. 95 Missouri's constitutional prohibition against incorporation specifically included a stipulation allowing churches to incorporate "under a general law for the purpose only of holding the title to such real estate as may be prescribed by law for church edifices, parsonages, and cemeteries." 98 The general law in effect at the time of Dignan's survey required a minimum of three people to incorporate so, despite the prohibition against incorporation, churches in Missouri could in fact form corporations aggregate to hold 90. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 91. See discussion supra Part IV.E. 92. See discussion supra Part IV.E. 93. DIGNAN, supra note 1, at 245-63; see discussion supra Part IV. E. 94. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-5-40 (2011) churches were permitted to own had increased to fifteen acres within city limits, unless the city passed a specific ordinance that could authorized up to fifty acres.
110
In early 2002, the Thomas Road Baptist Church of Lynchburg, Virginia, pursued an action to test the constitutionality of the Virginia prohibition against the incorporation of churches. 111 The Thomas Road church began by filing articles of incorporation with the State Corporation Commission ("SCC")-these articles were promptly denied on the grounds that "'Section 14 of Article IV of the Constitution of Virginia prohibits the incorporation of churches and religious denominations in Virginia.'" 112 The Thomas Road church then filed a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the theory that the SCC's failure to allow incorporation amounted to a denial of Thomas Road's constitutional rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. 113 The district court found in favor of the Thomas Road church and declared that the portion of section 14 (20) of Article IV of the Constitution of Virginia that prohibited the incorporation of churches to be in violation of the First Amendment's guarantee of the free exercise of religion. 114 Virginia's General Assembly responded by ratifying an amendment that deleted the paragraph related to charters of incorporation of churches from the constitution. 115 The present law in Virginia allows for the creation of either type of corporation for churches and religious organizations.
116
VII. CONCLUSION
In the present situation, there are twenty-five jurisdictions, twenty-four states plus the District of Columbia, which allow religious entitles to form corporations sole. 117 In none of these locations did the statute address the Church specifically; rather it referred to religious entities in general.
118 This number does not include the twelve specific dioceses in which the Church has been allowed to incorporate as a corporation sole by operation of private 110. Id. 111. Falwell v. Miller, 203 F. Supp. 2d 624, 628 (W.D. Va. 2002) and special laws. 119 In the eight states where the statutes addressed the Church specifically, the choice for incorporation was limited to corporations aggregate.
120
The remaining nineteen states limited the choice to corporations aggregate, but did not specifically refer to the Church. 121 Therefore, the Church is limited to incorporating in the aggregate form in a slight majority of the jurisdictions surveyed if the twelve specific dioceses are not included in the count. 122 Including those specific dioceses tips the scales in the other direction, although it does not change the overall number of states in which the Church may use the corporation sole mechanism.
123
The present situation is a significant change from the situation Dignan described in 1933. 124 He only identified eight states in which the Church could form a corporation sole through a general statute.
125 He also only identified six dioceses in which the Church could form a corporation sole through the operation of special or private laws.
126 However, we must keep in mind that he failed to identify five other dioceses that had the option of corporation sole at that time. 127 The number of states falling within the third paradigm, those with specific statutes requiring the Church to incorporate as a corporation aggregate, has remained constant. 128 The biggest change has come in the form of a decrease in states in the fourth paradigm (those with statutes referring to churches or religious organizations in general requiring the corporation aggregate mechanism) and the almost complete disappearance of the state constitutional provisions that proscribed the incorporation of churches or religious organizations (Virginia and Missouri 
